Mejia v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44516 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-8-2017
Mejia v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44516
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Mejia v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44516" (2017). Not Reported. 3588.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3588
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HUMBERTO MEJIA, JR., )
) NO. 44516
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) CANYON COUNTY NO. CV 2016-5813
v. )
)
STATE OF IDAHO, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Respondent. )
___________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE THOMAS J. RYAN
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho Criminal Law Division
I.S.B. #6555 P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
BRIAN R. DICKSON (208) 334-4534
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT RESPONDENT
iTABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1
Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .....................................................................8
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................9
I. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mejia’s
 Post-Conviction Petition Without Providing Mr. Mejia The
 Notice Or Opportunity To Respond Required By
 I.C. § 19-4906(b) ........................................................................................9
II. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Several Of
 Mr. Mejia’s Claims For Relief Based On Information From
 Hearings Held In The Underlying Criminal Case, As It Had
 Not, Nor Could It Have, Taken Proper Judicial Notice Of
 That Information .......................................................................................11
III. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Several
 Of Mr. Mejia’s Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel As
 Untimely Even Though His Petition Was Timely From The
 Judgment Of Conviction Under Proper Application Of The
 Prison Mailbox Rule ..................................................................................15
IV. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mejia’s Motion For
 Appointment Of Counsel Because He Alleged The Possibility
 Of A Valid Claim .......................................................................................19
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2006) ........................................................... 18
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004) ....................................................... 9, 20, 21
Ciccone v. State, 150 Idaho 305 (2010) .......................................................................... 5
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006)......................................................................... 20
Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437 (Ct. App. 2016) .............................................................. 11
Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 18, 19
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................................................... 20
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801 (1992) ................................................................ 12, 13
Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639 (1996) .................................................................. 15, 17
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159 (2014) .......................................................................... 20
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882 (2007) ................................................................... 13
Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2012) ....................................................... 17, 18
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96 (1999)................................................................................. 20
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644 (Ct. App. 1994)...................................................... 11, 13
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) ...................................................... 10, 11
Soot v. Cain, 570 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2009) .................................................................... 18
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................... 9
Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007) ........................................................................... 9
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010) ................................................................... 11
Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765 (Ct. App. 2008) .......................................................... 21
United States v. McNeill, 523 Fed.Appx. 979 (4th Cir. 2013) ........................................ 18
iii
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518 (2007) ...................................................................... 10
Statutes
I.C. § 19-4902 ............................................................................................................... 15
I.C. § 19-4904 ................................................................................................................. 9
I.C. § 19-4906 ........................................................................................................passim
Rules
I.A.R. 14(a) ................................................................................................................ 5, 15
I.C.A.R. 27(d) ................................................................................................................ 13
I.C.R. 35 .................................................................................................................passim
I.R.C.P. 54(a) .................................................................................................................. 7
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) .............................................................................................................. 10
I.R.E. 1005(b) ................................................................................................................ 13
I.R.E. 201(c)-(d)............................................................................................................. 11
1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Humberto Mejia contends the district court made several errors when it
summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief.  First, it erred by dismissing
his petition based only on the State’s Answer.  In doing so, the district court deprived
Mr. Mejia of the statutorily-required notice and opportunity to respond to the particular
alleged defects in his petition.  In fact, Mr. Mejia had viable responses which he tried to
make after the district court summarily dismissed his petition, but the district court did
not consider them.
Second, the district court did not identify the documents or exhibits from the
underlying criminal case of which it decided to take judicial notice.  This is problematic
because, not only did it rely on specific details from the entry of plea and sentencing
hearings from the underlying criminal case as it summarily dismissed several of
Mr. Mejia’s claims for relief, there were not any documents of which it could have
properly taken judicial notice which would have provided those details.  Even
considering the recordings of those hearings, the district court still erred in summarily
dismissing Mr. Mejia’s petition as he had alleged the possibility of valid claims which
were not disproved by those recordings.
Third, the district court improperly concluded that Mr. Mejia’s petition was not
filed timely from the judgment of conviction in the underlying criminal case.  Based on
the facts in the record, proper application of the prison mailbox rule reveals that
Mr. Mejia “filed” his post-conviction petition by delivering it to prison officials for mailing
some seven months before the deadline to file from the judgment of conviction.
2For any or all of those reasons, this Court should vacate the order summarily
dismissing Mr. Mejia’s petition and remand this case for further proceedings.
Additionally, since Mr. Mejia’s pleadings present the possibility of several valid claims,
an attorney should be appointed on remand.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Mejia pled guilty to domestic battery with
traumatic injury.  (R., p.52.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years,
with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over the case. (R., p.52.)  The judgment
of conviction was file-stamped on April 15, 2015.  (R., p.52.)  The district court ultimately
filed an order relinquishing jurisdiction on May 4, 2015.  (R., p.55.)  On November 6,
2015, the district court received a pro se motion for correction or reduction of sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) from Mr. Mejia.  (R., p.57.)  The district court
ultimately denied that motion as untimely.  (R., pp.60-62).  Mr. Mejia filed a notice of
appeal from the decision denying his Rule 35 motion, but that appeal was also
dismissed as untimely.  (R., p.67.)
Around the same time he filed his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Mejia requested and filled
out a petition for post-conviction relief.  (R., p.12 (affidavit of A. Dewayne Shedd, the
paralegal at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (hereinafter, IMSI) where Mr. Mejia
was being incarcerated).)  The petition was signed and notarized on November 1, 2015.
(R., pp.12, 21.)  Mr. Mejia delivered legal mail, purportedly the petition for post-
conviction relief, to prison staff members to be mailed on November 5, 2015.  (R., p.12;
see also R., p.15 (copy of the Mr. Mejia’s mail log verifying that documents were
received by prison staff on November 5, 2015.)
3In that petition, Mr. Mejia asserted his trial attorney had provided ineffective
assistance by “not giving me further information on my sentencing recommendations
and foiled my PSI attacks,” which “has caused a mix[ture] of legal problems in IDOC.”1
(R., p.20.)  He also asserted that he had not heard from his trial attorney since the
sentencing hearing.  (R., p.20.)  To that point, he asserted he was having issues figuring
out what the cause for the decision to relinquish jurisdiction was.  (R., p.19.)  The
certificate of mailing accompanying his petition stated that Mr. Mejia “mailed a copy of
this petition for post conviction relief for the purposes of filing with the court,” and that a
copy had also been sent to the prosecuting attorney.  (R., p.22 (capitalization altered).)
However, it was actually only sent to the prosecuting attorney.  (R., pp.12, 15.)
Then, on January 21, 2016, the district court received a pro se Motion to
Postpone Post-Conviction from Mr. Mejia, which he filed “so that court is aware of my
filing” of the post-conviction petition.  (R., p.16.)  A copy of his initial petition was
attached to that motion.  (R., pp.16-21.)  Only the motion to postpone post-conviction,
not the petition itself, was file-stamped.  (R., pp.16, 18.)
No further action appears to have occurred on the post-conviction front until after
Mr. Mejia’s Rule 35 motion was dismissed.  At that point, on June 21, 2016, he filed a
supplemental post-conviction petition so as to include claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in regard to the Rule 35 proceedings, such as that trial counsel should “have
responded to the court’s dismissal of I.C.R. 35” motion.  (R., pp.3, 9.)  He also provided
more allegations relating to his claim about counsel’s ineffective assistance in the
1 To the extent possible, spelling and other grammatical mistakes have been corrected
when quoting Mr. Mejia’s pro se filings.
4presentence process, asserting trial counsel had not provided a copy of the
presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) for Mr. Mejia to review sufficiently in
advance of the sentencing hearing.  (R., p.9.)  In addition, he made claims about trial
counsel’s insufficient advice prior to entry of the guilty plea, such as “I wasn’t informed
prior to entry of my guilty plea the minimum and maximum potential sentence.”
(R., p.9.)  Finally, he attached Mr. Shedd’s affidavit, which included copies of his motion
to postpone and his initial petition.  (See R., pp.12-22.)  To that point, Mr. Mejia attested
a prison staff member had told him “Canyon County didn’t file it [his initial petition] due
to it being sent as an exhibit.”  (R., pp.26-27.)  He also alleged that he had used the
same process to submit his initial petition for filing as he had to submit his Rule 35
motion.  (R., p.26.)  Mr. Mejia filed a motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel
with his supplemental petition.  (R., pp.29-31.)
On July 13, 2016, the State filed its Answer to Mr. Mejia’s petition.  (R., p.39.)  In
that Answer, it generally admitted or denied the allegations in Mr. Mejia’s supplemental
petition, briefly identified several affirmative defenses it felt were applicable, and offered
the following prayer for relief:  “a) That Petitioner’s claims for Post-Conviction Relief be
denied and/or dismissed; and b) For such other and further relief as the court deems
necessary in this case.”  (R., pp.39-41.)  It also provided copies of the Information,
Guilty Plea Advisory, Judgment of Conviction, Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, Rule 35
Motion, and Order Denying the Rule 35 Motion from the underlying criminal case as
exhibits to its Answer.  (R., pp.40, 43-63.)  The only other motion the State filed was a
motion for waiver of the attorney-client privilege between Mr. Mejia and his trial counsel.
(R., p.64; see generally R.)
5However, based on the State’s filing, the district court entered a Memorandum
Decision and Order Upon Petitioner’s Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on
September 7, 2016.  (R., p.66.)  It acknowledged only three claims in Mr. Mejia’s filings:
that trial counsel had failed to discover or raise issues in regard to the dismissal of his
Rule 35 motion, that he had not been informed of the minimum and maximum potential
penalties prior to the entry of his plea, and that the Court accepted his plea without
giving him an opportunity to speak.  (R., p.67.)  It did not identify what, if any,
documents from the underlying criminal case file of which it was taking judicial notice.
(See generally R., pp.66-71.)  However, it did quote from the PSI report.  (R., p.66 n.1.)
It also recounted in some detail the discussions held during the entry of plea hearing on
February 20, 2015, and the sentencing hearing on April 13, 2015.2  (See R., p.70.)
Relying on that recitation, the district court concluded several of Mr. Mejia’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel were disproved by the record.  (R., p.70.)
The district court also calculated that, to be timely from the judgment of
conviction, Mr. Mejia would have had to file his petition for post-conviction relief by
May 26, 2016.3  (R., p.71.)  It acknowledged Mr. Mejia’s claim that he tendered his initial
2 This Court granted Mr. Mejia’s motion to take judicial notice of the minutes from those
hearings.  (Order Granting Motion to take Judicial Notice, dated March 13, 2017.)  They
will be referred to herein as “2/20/15 Minutes” and “4/13/15 Minutes.”  It also granted his
motion to augment the record with the audio recordings of those hearings. (Order
Granting Motion to Augment, dated April 24, 2017.)  As a result, however, it denied his
request to augment the record with transcripts of those hearings.  (Order Granting
Motion to Augment, dated April 24, 2017.)
3 The district court appears to have miscalculated.  While the Judgment of Conviction
was signed on April 14, 2015, (R., p.54), it was not entered, as evidenced by the file-
stamp, until the following date.  (R., p.52.)  That means Mr. Mejia actually had until
May 27, 2016, to file his petition timely from the Judgment of Conviction. See I.A.R.
14(a); Ciccone v. State, 150 Idaho 305, 306-07 (2010) (“the date evidenced by the filing
6petition to IMSI officials on November 5, 2015, and that his Motion to Postpone Post-
Conviction was “tendered to IMSI officials on June 15, 2016,[4] and filed with the
Canyon County Clerk’s Office on January 21, 2016.”  (R, p.71.)  Nevertheless, the
district court concluded, because there was no indication the initial petition had, itself,
actually been filed with the district court, all Mr. Mejia’s claims arising in relation to the
judgment of conviction, such as those relating to counsel’s advice during the guilty plea
proceedings, were untimely.  (R., p.71.)  Given all those conclusions, the district court
denied Mr. Mejia’s request for counsel and indicated the State’s “Motion for Summary
Dismissal is granted.”  (R., p.71 (capitalization altered).)
The week after the district court ordered his petition be summarily dismissed,
Mr. Mejia filed a Notice of Appeal.  (R., p.73.)  He filed several other documents and
affidavits alongside that Notice of Appeal.  (See generally R., pp.87-291.)  In one of
those affidavits, he asserted that he was attempting to reply to the order of summary
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906.  (R., pp.90-91.)  To that end, he provided, inter
alia, copies of two letters he had sent to the district court clerk, one dated November 25,
2015, and the other dated December 7, 2015, in which he requested the clerk update
him on the status of “my Rule 35 motion along with my post-conviction relief.”
(R., pp.161, 162.)  He also alleged that his trial attorney “had me rush through my guilty
plea advisory form” on the day of the plea, such that he was not “able to fully
stamp serves as a reference point from which to calculate the 42-day period for
appeal.”) (internal quotation omitted).
4 This appears to be a typographical error.  While Mr. Mejia’s supplemental petition was
notarized on June 15, 2016 (R., p.3), his motion to postpone was actually signed on
January 12, 2016.  (R., p.17.)  Therefore, he would necessarily have had to tender the
motion to postpone to prison staff between that date and January 21, 2016, the date it
was received and file-stamped by the district court.  (See R., p.16.)
7understand my constitutional rights.”  (R., pp.96, 116.)  In addition, he alleged that,
when he tried to discuss challenges to the information in the PSI with his trial attorney,
she told him, “You’re right, I don’t want to help,” and that trial counsel had proceeded to
argue Mr. Mejia was unremorseful, which was not the case.  (R., p.97.)
The district court did not address Mr. Mejia’s attempted reply.  (See generally R.)
All it did, after the Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed Mr. Mejia’s appeal for
lack of a final judgment conforming with I.R.C.P. 54(a), was enter a final judgment on
October 11, 2016.  (R., pp.292-95.)
8ISSUES
1. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Mejia’s post-
conviction petition without providing Mr. Mejia the notice or opportunity to
respond required by I.C. § 19-4906(b).
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing several of Mr. Mejia’s
claims for relief based on information from hearings held in the underlying
criminal case, as it had not, nor could it have, taken proper judicial notice of that
information.
3. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed several of
Mr. Mejia’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as untimely even though
his petition was timely from the judgment of conviction under proper application
of the prison mailbox rule.
4. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Mejia’s motion for
appointment of counsel because he alleged the possibility of a valid claim.
9ARGUMENT
Review of the district court’s application of the post-conviction statute to a
particular case is a matter of free review. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 791
(2004).  Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904, the district court should appoint counsel in a post-
conviction case if the petitioner “alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim.”
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  This standard for determining whether there is a
possibility of a valid claim is lower even than the standard for summarily dismissing a
petition. See Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007) (“The investigation by
counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  But, the
decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is
appointed are controlled by two different standards.”)
A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the petitioner to allege
that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to the
petitioner. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  In determining
whether the petitioner has alleged the possibility of a valid claim, all the facts are to be
construed in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.
I.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mejia’s Post-Conviction Petition
Without Providing Mr. Mejia The Notice Or Opportunity To Respond Required By
I.C. § 19-4906(b)
Idaho Code § 19-4906 requires that, before a post-conviction petition may be
summarily dismissed, the petitioner must be given notice of the alleged deficiencies in
his petition and an opportunity to respond thereto.  I.C. § 19-4906(b).  Notice can be
given either by a sufficient motion for summary judgment filed by the State, or by a
10
Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed by the district court itself. Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319, 321-22 (1995).  In this case, the district court purported to grant the State’s
“motion for summary dismissal.”  (See R., pp.67, 71.)  That is problematic because the
State never actually filed a motion for summary dismissal.  (See generally R.)  All it did
was file an Answer to Mr. Mejia’s petition.  (R., pp.39-41.)
In a nearly-identical situation, the Idaho Supreme Court held that such an Answer
does not provide sufficient notice because it does not state the grounds for dismissal
“with particularity,” nor does it claim to be “the state’s motion for summary disposition
under I.C. § 19-4906(c),” as per the requirements of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). Saykhamchone,
127 Idaho at 322 (emphasis from original).  “Furthermore,” the Saykhamchone Court
explained, “when the state files an answer, as it did here, the petitioner can rightly
expect the matter will go to an evidentiary hearing on the issues framed by the
pleadings, unless the district court provides a twenty-day notice of intent to dismiss, or
the state files a motion for summary dismissal.” Id.  Accordingly, to satisfy the notice
requirements, the State needs to actually file a separate motion for summary dismissal,
in which it addresses the alleged basis for summary dismissal with particularity and
specifically invokes the language of I.C. § 19-4906(c) as the authority for the motion.
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322; accord Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524
(2007) (reaffirming that this is the best practice).
In this case, as it did in Saykhamchone, the State filed an Answer which neither
identified with particularity the alleged problems with Mr. Mejia’s petition, nor identified
itself as the State’s motion for summary judgment under I.C. § 19-4906.  (See generally
R., pp.39-41.)  In fact, the Answer also does not reference I.C. § 19-4906 or invoke its
11
language at all.  (See generally R., pp.39-41.)  Therefore, the Answer did not provide
proper notice of any alleged deficiencies in Mr. Mejia’s petition.  As such, there was no
indication he needed to respond to the State’s Answer.  Rather, at that point, Mr. Mejia
could rightly expect the matter to go to an evidentiary hearing on the issues framed by
the pleadings. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322.
Since there was no motion for summary dismissal and no Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, Mr. Mejia had neither the notice nor the opportunity to respond prior to the
district court summarily dismissing his petition as required by the post-conviction
statute.  As such, this Court should, like it did in Saykhamchone, vacate the order of
summary dismissal for failure to comply with I.C. § 19-4906.
II.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Several Of Mr. Mejia’s Claims For
Relief Based On Information From Hearings Held In The Underlying Criminal Case, As
It Had Not, Nor Could It Have, Taken Proper Judicial Notice Of That Information
“No part of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record in the
post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered as an exhibit.” Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644, 648 (Ct. App. 1994).  One way for that to happen is for the district court to
take judicial notice of documents and exhibits in the record from the underlying criminal
case. See, e.g., Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 442-43 (Ct. App. 2016).  One of the
requirements in that process is that “the court shall identify the specific documents or
items that were so noticed.”  I.R.E. 201(c)-(d).  Thus, the district court errs when it
purports to generally take judicial notice of other proceedings without specifying which
documents or exhibits from that other proceeding it is considering. See, e.g., Taylor v.
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835-36 (2010); Fortin, 160 Idaho at 442-43.
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In this case, the district court certainly appeared to consider facts from the
underlying criminal case in its order summarily dismissing the petition as, for example, it
recited details from the entry of plea and sentencing hearings.  (See R., pp.66-71.)
However, the district court never identified which specific documents or items it had
judicially noticed in order to gain access to those facts in the post-conviction case.  (See
generally R.)  Therefore, the district court erred in considering that information to
support its decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Mejia’s post-conviction petition.
More troubling than its failure to simply identify what documents it was
considering, though, is the fact that there was not actually anything of which the district
court could have properly taken judicial notice to get the detailed information upon
which it was relying.  This problem is most evident in regard to the district court’s
recitation of the facts from the April 13, 2015, sentencing hearing.  For example, the
minutes of that hearing, of which the district court might have taken judicial notice, do
not provide the same level of detail as the post-conviction court’s recitation.  (Compare
R., p.70; with 4/13/15 Minutes.)  Additionally, as to the February 20, 2016, entry of plea
hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the district court examined Mr. Mejia
and he “answered the Court’s questions satisfactorily.”  (R., p.70.)  However, the
minutes only generally describe that colloquy.  (2/20/15 Minutes.)  “Judicial notice taken
of prior reported but not transcribed testimony cannot be allowed because conclusions
drawn from that source are incapable of being reviewed by an appellate court.”
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808 (1992).  Therefore, the district court could not
simply have taken judicial notice of the minutes of those hearings to support its findings.
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The district court could have also reviewed the audio recordings of those
hearings.  (Compare R., p.70 with Augmented Audio.)  However, such audio recordings
of hearings are “not admissible as an official transcript under I.R.E. 1005(b).”
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 887 (2007).  Rather, a transcript needs to be
produced from the audio recording, and the transcript, if prepared in accordance with
I.C.A.R. 27(d), would be admissible as evidence. Navarro, 144 Idaho at 887.
Therefore, even if it had reviewed the audio of those hearings, it would not have been
proper for the district court to base its decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Mejia’s petition
on those recordings.  Rather, if upon review, the audio revealed relevant information,
the district court would need to order production of the transcripts of those hearings in
accordance with I.C.A.R. 27(d).
Finally, as to the sentencing hearing, the district court might also have taken
judicial notice of its own memory of that hearing.5  “A judge may take judicial notice of
personal recollection of prior proceedings to the extent that the judge recalls what
occurred.  However, the previous hearing must be transcribed so that any alleged error
in such judicial notice is subject to appellate review.” Navarro, 144 Idaho at 887
(emphasis added).  Without such a transcript, the district court errs by taking judicial
notice of its own memory. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807 (1992);
Roman, 125 Idaho at 648.  There is no indication that the sentencing hearing from the
underlying criminal case was transcribed.6  (See generally R.)  Without such a
5 This potential explanation only exists in regard to the sentencing hearing, as a
different judge presided over the entry of plea hearing.  (See R., pp.70-71.)
6 In his amended notice of appeal, Mr. Mejia requested copies of all transcripts or
exhibits lodged by the court in support of or opposition to the dismissal of his petition.
(R., p.305.)  A transcript of the sentencing hearing was not provided pursuant to that
14
transcript, the district court could not properly take judicial notice of its memory of the
sentencing hearing as it summarily dismissed Mr. Mejia’s petition.
Since it had not, nor could it have, properly taken judicial notice of the facts it
purported to rely on to dismiss several of Mr. Mejia’s claims for relief, the district court
erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Mejia’s petition based on its apparent review of the
criminal case hearings.
Beyond the procedural problems with the district court’s consideration of the facts
from those hearings, its ultimate conclusion – that those proceedings disprove his
claims on post-conviction – is also erroneous.  For example, one of Mr. Mejia’s main
claims was that “I wasn’t informed prior to entry of my guilty plea the minimum and
maximum potential sentence,” and that trial counsel had “not giv[en] me further
information on my sentencing recommendations.”  (R., pp.9, 20.)  Nothing in the audio
recordings contradicts those allegations of fact about what trial counsel did or did not
advise in that regard.  (See generally Augmented Audio.)  Therefore, for the reasons
discussed in depth in Section III (specifically, pages 20-22), infra, even if the district
court did properly consider the audio recordings, or did properly consider its memory of
the sentencing hearing, the information in those recordings does not change the fact
that, with the facts construed in his favor, Mr. Mejia still alleged the possibility of a valid
claim regarding trial counsel’s deficient performance.
Additionally, the fact that the recording of the sentencing hearing reveals that trial
counsel made some corrections to the PSI does not disprove Mr. Mejia’s allegations
request.  That is unsurprising, as it is undersigned counsel’s understanding that the
sentencing hearing has not actually been transcribed.  (See 4/18/17 Affidavit of Brian R.
Dickson (attached to the Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule).)
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that trial counsel did not provide sufficiently in advance of the sentencing hearing for his
review, or his attempted clarification that she refused to discuss all the corrections he
felt necessary.  (R., pp.9, 97.)  And even though those recordings do disprove some of
his allegations (such as his attempted clarification that trial counsel argued he was not
remorseful (R., p.97)), that does not demonstrate he raised no possibility of a valid claim
in the entirety of his petition.
As such, even considering the audio recordings, the district court’s decision to
dismiss Mr. Mejia’s petition without appointing counsel or providing an opportunity to
respond is still erroneous.
III.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Several Of Mr. Mejia’s Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel As Untimely Even Though His Petition Was Timely
From The Judgment Of Conviction Under Proper Application Of The Prison Mailbox
Rule
Idaho Code § 19-4902 provides that, when no direct appeal is filed from a
particular judgment or order, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within one
year from the expiration of time to appeal from that judgment or order.  I.C. § 19-
4902(a).  That means, for Mr. Mejia’s petition for post-conviction relief to be timely from
the judgment of conviction, it would need to have been filed by May 27, 2016. See
I.A.R. 14(a).
There is, however, an exception to that rule for incarcerated persons.  Under the
“prison mailbox rule,” a pro se inmate’s filings are deemed to be “filed” on the date he
delivers them to prison officials for the purpose of mailing. Munson v. State, 128 Idaho
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639, 642 (1996) (specifically applying the mailbox rule to petitions for post-conviction
relief).  This rule is meant to address the practicalities of incarceration:
the pro se inmates did not have control over the delays between prison
authorities’ receipt of the inmates court documents and the formal filing by
the court clerk.  Thus, no matter how far in advance pro se prisoners
deliver their petitions to the proper prison authorities, they can never be
sure that their petitions ultimately will be filed on time by the court clerk.
Id.
According to the affidavit of Mr. Shedd, the IMSI paralegal, Mr. Mejia delivered
legal documents “purported to be inmate Mejia’s copy of his Petition and Affidavit for
Post-Conviction Relief” to prison authorities for mailing on November 5, 2015.
(R., pp.12, 15.)  Given that uncontested factual assertion, Mr. Mejia “filed” his initial
petition, pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, on November 5, 2015.  To that point,
Mr. Mejia alleged he used the same procedure to file his initial petition that he had used
to submit his Rule 35 motion for filing the week before (R., p.26), and his Rule 35
motion was actually sent to, and ruled on by, the district court.  (See R., pp.60-62.)
Thus, he had no reason to believe the same would not be true for his initial petition for
post-conviction relief.
The fact that the prison staff ultimately did not send the initial petition to the
district court does not change the conclusion that the petition was “filed” as of
November 5, 2015.  (See R.,  p.71  (the  district  court  refusing  to  consider  several  of
Mr. Mejia’s post-conviction claims based on the fact that “[t]here is no indication his
petition was filed with the court.”).)  First, according to the certificate of mailing,
Mr. Mejia “mailed a copy of this petition for post conviction relief for the purpose of filing
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with the court.”7  (R., p.22 (capitalization altered) (emphasis added).)  Thus, it was clear
from the form provided to Mr. Mejia that he was directing the documents be sent to the
district court for filing.  Therefore, the fact that the prison authorities did not follow the
direction to mail a copy of the initial petition to the district court should not be held
against Mr. Mejia.  “The whole point [of the mailbox rule] is that the prisoner is not at
liberty to freely monitor his correspondences from mailing to delivery.” Ray v. Clements,
700 F.3d 993, 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis from original).
Second, the mailbox rule applies regardless of whether the prison officials
actually send the document to the district court.  That is because the rule turns on the
prisoner’s inability to control the documents after submission to the prison officials.
Munson, 128 Idaho at 642.  “Whether or not the petition is actually placed in the mail,
7 Although Mr. Shedd’s affidavit indicates the initial petition was sent only to the
prosecutor’s office “as noted in the Certificate of Mailing” (R., p.12), the form certificate
provided to Mr. Mejia directed him to just list the prosecutor’s office, not the district court
clerk, on the certificate.  (See R., p.22.)  Specifically, that form read, in its entirety:
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ____ day of ________, 20__, I mailed a copy of
this PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELEIF for the purposes of filing with
the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system to the
U.S. mail system to:
__________ County Prosecuting Attorney
_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________
Petitioner
(R., p.22; compare R., p.59 (the certificate of mailing with Mr. Mejia’s Rule 35 motion,
which was properly sent to the district court even though the form certificate provided
with the Rule 35 motion does not mention the court at all).)  Therefore, the fact that
Mr. Mejia filled out the form as directed indicates any issue caused by the way that form
was crafted should not be held against Mr. Mejia.
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delivered to the court or filed once it arrives there, are all matters beyond the prisoner’s
control.” Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).  Although Idaho’s courts
do not appear to have established precedent on this particular question, several federal
circuits have expressly held, based on those concerns, the mailbox rule applies even if
the documents do not actually reach the district court. See, e.g., United States v.
McNeill, 523 Fed.Appx. 979, 982 (4th Cir. 2013); Ray, 700 F.3d at 1012; Soot v. Cain,
570 F.3d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2009); Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.
2006); Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1223.8
Mr. Mejia presented evidence, notably, Mr. Shedd’s affidavit, which stated that he
delivered his initial petition to prison officials for mailing on November 5, 2015.
(R., p.12.)  Therefore, regardless of whether those documents actually made it to the
district court, they were “filed” on that date under the prison mailbox rule.
And even if this Court concludes the initial petition was not properly filed at that
time, Mr. Mejia presented sufficient evidence with his supplemental petition to show the
initial petition should have been deemed filed, at the latest, as of January 21, 2016.
First, he included Mr. Shedd’s affidavit, which included copies of his motion to postpone
post-conviction and the initial petition attached thereto.  (R., pp.12, 16.)  The motion to
postpone, which was actually file-stamped by the district court on January 21, 2016,
8 While the circuit courts seem to agree with the principle that the mailbox rule applies
regardless of whether the document is actually filed with the court, they employ varying
standards for assessing whether that rule applies to the facts of a particular case.
Compare, e.g., Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1223 (requiring the petitioner make an additional
showing of reasonably-diligent efforts to follow up on his attempted filing); with Ray, 700
F.3d at 1012 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s diligence requirement, and requiring only that
the petitioner make a prima facie showing that the document was delivered to prison
officials, at which point, the burden shifts to the State to disprove that delivery occurred).
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specifically asked the district court to acknowledge the fact that Mr. Mejia had filed the
attached initial petition.  (R., p.16 (to make sure “that court is aware of my filing”).)
Second, Mr. Mejia provided an affidavit in which he alleged that a prison staff member
had told him “that Canyon County didn’t file it [the initial petition] due to it being sent as
an exhibit.”  (R., pp.26-27.)
Those two facts, if true, demonstrate the district court actually received a copy of
his initial petition on January 21, 2016, along with a specific request to acknowledge its
filing, but the district court simply refused to do so.  “A private party, especially a
petitioner, will be at a loss for what to do, other than wait, if the court fails to respond to
such an inquiry.” Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1224.  Therefore, those two facts, considered in
the light most favorable to Mr. Mejia, demonstrate the initial petition should be deemed
to have been filed, at least, as of January 21, 2016.  That would still be timely from the
judgment of conviction, which was file-stamped April 15, 2015.
IV.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mejia’s Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel Because He Alleged The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
Because Mr. Mejia’s petition was “filed” timely from the judgment of conviction, all
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to the guilty plea proceedings
and sentencing proceedings, which the district court refused to consider as untimely
(R., p.71), were actually all properly before the district court on post-conviction.  That
includes Mr. Mejia’s claim that his trial attorney did not sufficiently advise him in the
guilty plea advisory context, for example, by not informing him of the minimum and
maximum potential penalties before entering the plea agreement.  (R., p.9.)  That
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allegation asserts the possibility of a valid claim. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,
99 (1999) (reiterating that, if the defendant proves he was not advised of the
consequences of his plea, that is a valid basis for post-conviction relief); see also
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (reaffirming that, at this stage of post-conviction
proceedings, the district court is to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
petitioner); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the
petitioner’s verified pleadings and affidavits count as evidence and summary judgment
may be denied on those filings alone).
And, contrary to the district court’s conclusion (see R., p.70), the fact that the
district court might have advised the defendant of his rights during the guilty plea
colloquy does not actually disprove this sort of claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 166-68 (2014) (holding the district
court’s advice to the defendant about his Estrada rights9 did not eliminate counsel’s
obligations to discuss those rights with the defendant, though that fact may ultimately
weigh against the petitioner in the prejudice analysis).  At best, that contrary information
simply establishes a genuine issue of material fact – whether Mr. Mejia was adequately
advised of the consequences of his plea before he entered it.   Since the district court is
to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner at this stage of
proceedings, summary dismissal on that point is improper. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793.
It is also worth noting that, in his unconsidered attempt to reply to the summary
dismissal, Mr. Mejia sought to provide additional facts about his claim that trial counsel
9 See Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006).
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provided inadequate advice during the guilty plea proceedings.  For example, he
alleged his trial attorney “had me rush through my guilty plea advisory form” on the day
of the plea, such that he was not “able to fully understand my constitutional rights.”
(R., pp.96, 116.)  The guilty plea questionnaire actually supports that claim.  For
example, Mr. Mejia answered the question on that form regarding whether he would be
required to give a DNA sample following his plea in the underlying case in the negative.
(R., p.50.)  That was incorrect under I.C. § 19-5506(1), but that misunderstanding was
apparently not corrected by trial counsel.  (See R., p.50.)  That is particularly important
in this case since Mr. Mejia’s refusal to give a DNA sample at the correctional institution
was one of the reasons the district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction.  (See
R., p.61.)  As such, that would also allege the possibility of a valid claim, if it had been
considered by the district court.
Continuing with his theme of inadequate advice and communication from trial
counsel, Mr. Mejia had also alleged that trial counsel had not communicated with him
after the sentencing hearing, such that he was unclear as to what the basis for the
district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was.  (R., pp.19-20.)  This allegation of
a failure to communicate alleges the possibility of a valid claim, at least in regard to the
relinquishment context as well as to Mr. Mejia’s allegations about trial counsel’s failure
to assist him in the Rule 35 context. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 768
(Ct. App. 2008) (acknowledging failure to communicate is a potentially-valid post-
conviction claim, if the petitioner can also show how that affected the proceedings); cf.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (acknowledging that a pro se petitioner may not allege
certain facts necessary to proceed on a possibly-valid claim simply because the pro se
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petitioner is unaware as to the elements of a valid claim, and thus, revealing the need
for counsel to be appointed in such cases).
Since Mr. Mejia has alleged the possibility of several valid claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, the district court’s refusal to consider several of those cases
based on its miscalculation of whether his petition was timely filed is problematic.  This
is particularly true in light of the absence of the statutorily-required notice and
opportunity to be heard, and the district court’s improper reliance on facts from the
underlying criminal case.  As a result, this case should be remanded so the district court
can actually consider and rule on Mr. Mejia’s claims for relief after appointing an
attorney to assist him.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mejia respectfully requests this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings after
he is appointed an attorney.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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